viernes, 30 de noviembre de 2012

Acosta Chaparro, intermediario de Calderón con el narco: Anabel Hernández a CNN (30-11-2012)





Al presentar “México en llamas, el legado de Felipe Calderón”, la periodista Anabel Hernández reveló al programa de Aristegui de CNN en Español que  Calderón intentó negociar con el crimen organizado y utilizó como intermediario  al general en retiro  Mario Arturo Acosta Chaparro.

La periodista afirmó que el mismo militar le contó que el presidente y el entonces secretario de Gobernación, Juan Camilo Mouriño, lo habían enviado a  sostener reuniones con grupos criminales.
Y agregó que días antes de que fuera asesinado, Acosta Chaparro se encontrabanegociando con la DEA para hacer una lista de los militares  presuntamente involucrados con el narcotráfico
Hernández refirió que  la destitución de general Tomás  Ángeles Dauahare  se dio días después de una reunió que sostuvo con Felipe Calderón, donde  le reveló los nombres de  funcionarios del gabinete, del Ejército y de la Secretaría de Seguridad Pública.

Además, manifestó que los militares  nunca fueron dueños de la estrategia contra el narco.  Era la Secretaría de  Seguridad Pública federal quien  definía la estrategia y el ejército sólo era el ejecutor.



lunes, 26 de noviembre de 2012

‘The Economist’ compara cifras de asesinatos en México con países africanos




De acuerdo a las estadísticas del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública (SNSP) y la Oficina de las Naciones Unidas para el Crimen Organizado (UNODC), el semanario británico The Economist publicó un gráfico donde compara el número de homicidios en los estados de la República Mexicaa con algunos países de África, Medio Oriente y Europa.

“La tasa de homicidios se ha duplicado en los últimos cinco años. Para dar idea de cómo los estados de México son más seguros o peligrosos, se han comparado con las estadísticas de delincuencia de otros países”, expone The Economist.

Estados como Nuevo León presentan un número cercano en crímenes como Ruanda; Sinaloa con una cifra de asesinatos  comparado  con Madagascar; Chihuahua con Ucrania; Morelos con Nepal; Michoacán con Nicaragua; el Estado de México con Kazajistán; Zacatecas comparado con Israel.
De acuerdo al mapa los estados con menor tasa de homicidios con: Yucatán, Tlaxcala, Aguascalientes, Hidalgo, Querétaro y Campeche



viernes, 23 de noviembre de 2012

Constraints Facing the Next Mexican President (Noviembre 21, STRATFOR)


Enrique Pena Nieto will be sworn in as Mexico's next president Dec. 1. He will take office at a very interesting point in Mexican history. Mexico is experiencing an economic upturn that may become even more pronounced if Pena Nieto's Institutional Revolutionary Party administration is able to work with its rivals in the National Action Party to enact needed reforms to Mexico's labor, financial and energy laws.
Another arrestor to further expanding Mexico's economy has been the ongoing cartel violence in Mexico and the dampening effect it has had on outside investment and tourism. Pena Nieto realizes that Mexico's economy would be doing even better were it not for the chilling effect of the violence. During his campaign, he pledged to cut Mexico's murder rate in half by the end of his six-year term, to increase the number of federal police officers and to create a new gendarmerie to use in place of military troops to combat heavily armed criminals in Mexico's most violent locations.
According to Mexico's El Universal newspaper, Pena Nieto is also proposing to eliminate the Secretariat of Public Security and consolidate its functions, including the federal police, under the Secretariat of the Interior. This move is intended to increase coordination of federal efforts against the cartels and to fight corruption. The federal police are under heavy scrutiny for the involvement of 19 officers in the Aug. 24 attack against a U.S. diplomatic vehicle in Tres Marias, Morelos state. This incident has long faded from attention in the United States, but the investigation into the attack remains front-page news in Mexico.
Of course, there are also commentators who note that Pena Nieto's election is a return to power for the Institutional Revolutionary Party, which held power in Mexico for some 70 years prior to the election of Vicente Fox of the National Action Party in 2000, and Felipe Calderon in 2006. This narrative claims that Pena Nieto will quickly return to the Institutional Revolutionary Party policy of negotiating with and accommodating the cartel organizations, which will solve Mexico's violence problem.
Unfortunately for Mexico, neither law enforcement reforms nor a deal with the cartels will quickly end the violence. The nature of the Mexican drug cartels and the dynamic between them has changed considerably since Pena Nieto's party lost the presidency, and the same constraints that have faced his two most recent predecessors, Vicente Fox and Felipe Calderon, will also dictate his policy options as he attempts to reduce cartel violence.

Constraints

As George Friedman noted about the U.S. presidential election, candidates frequently aspire to institute particular policies when elected, but once in office, presidents often find that their policy choices are heavily constrained by outside forces. This same concept holds true for the president of Mexico.
Fox and Calderon each came into office with plans to reform Mexico's law enforcement agencies, and yet each of those attempts has failed. Indeed, recent Mexican history is replete with police agencies dissolved or rolled into another agency due to charges of corruption. The Federal Investigative Agency, established in 2001 by the Fox administration, is a prime example of a "new" Mexican law enforcement agency that was established to fight -- and subsequently dissolved because of -- corruption. Pena Nieto's plans for law enforcement reform will be heavily constrained by this history -- and by Mexican culture. Institutions tend to reflect the culture that surrounds them, and it is very difficult to establish an institution that is resistant to corruption if the culture surrounding the institution is not supportive of such efforts.
Another important constraint on the Pena Nieto administration is that the flow of narcotics from South America to the United States has changed over the past two decades. Due to enforcement efforts by the U.S. government, the routes through the Caribbean have been largely curtailed, shifting the flow increasingly toward Mexico. At the same time, the Colombian and U.S. authorities have made considerable headway in their campaign to dismantle the largest of the Colombian cartels. This has resulted in the Mexican cartels becoming increasingly powerful. In fact, Mexican cartels have expanded their control over the global cocaine trade and now control a good deal of the cocaine trafficking to Europe and Australia.
While the Mexican cartels have always been involved in the smuggling of Marijuana to the United States, in recent years they have also increased their involvement in the manufacturing of methamphetamine and black-tar heroinfor U.S. sale while increasing their involvement in the trafficking of prescription medications like oxycodone. While the cocaine market in the United States has declined slightly in recent years, use of these other drugs has increased, creating a lucrative profit pool for the Mexican cartels. Unlike cocaine, which the Mexicans have to buy from South American producers, the Mexican cartels can exact greater profit margins from the narcotics they produce themselves.
This change in drug routes and the type of drugs moved means that the smuggling routes through Mexico have become more lucrative then ever, and the increased value of these corridors has increased the competition to control them. This inter-cartel competition has translated into significant violence, not only in cities that directly border on the United States like Juarez or Nuevo Laredo but also in port cities like Veracruz and Acapulco and regional transportation hubs like Guadalajara and Monterrey.

Cartels Evolve

The nature of the Mexican cartels themselves has also changed. Gone are the days when a powerful individual such as Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo could preside over a single powerful organization like the Guadalajara cartel that could control most of the drug trafficking through Mexico and resolve disputes between subordinate trafficking organizations. The post-Guadalajara cartel climate in Mexico has been one of vicious competition between competing cartels -- competition that has become increasingly militarized as cartel groups recruited first former police officers and then former special operations soldiers into their enforcer units. Today's Mexican cartels commonly engage in armed confrontations with rival cartels and the government using military ordnance, such as automatic weapons, hand grenades and rocket-propelled grenades.
It is also important to realize that government operations are not the main cause of violence in Mexico today. Rather, the primary cause of the death and mayhem in Mexico is cartel-on-cartel violence. The Calderon administration has been criticized for its policy of decapitating the cartel groups, which has in recent years resulted in the fragmenting of some cartels such as the Beltran Leyva Organization, La Familia Michoacana and the Gulf cartel -- and thus an increase in intra-cartel violence. But such violence began in the 1990s, long before the decapitation strategy was implemented.
Because the struggle for control of lucrative smuggling routes is the primary driver for the violence, even if the Pena Nieto administration were to abandon the decapitation strategy and order the Mexican military and federal police to stand down in their operations against the cartels, the war between the cartels would continue to rage on in cities such as Monterrey, Nuevo Laredo, Guadalajara and Acapulco. Because of this, Pena Nieto will have little choice but to continue the use of the military against the cartels for the foreseeable future. The proposed gendarmerie will be able to shoulder some of that burden once it is created, but it will take years before enough paramilitary police officers are recruited and trained to replace the approximately 30,000 Mexican soldiers and marines currently dedicated to keeping the peace in Mexico's most violent areas.
One other way that the cartels have changed is that many of them are now allied with local street gangs and pay their gang allies with product -- meaning that street-level sales and drug abuse are increasing in Mexico. Narcotics are no longer commodities that merely pass through Mexico on their way to plague the Americans. This increase in local distribution has brought with it a second tier of violence as street gangs fight over retail distribution turf in Mexican cities.
Finally, most of the cartels have branched out into other criminal endeavors, such as kidnapping, extortion, alien smuggling and cargo theft, in addition to narcotics smuggling. Los Zetas, for example, make a considerable amount of money stealing oil from Mexico's state-run oil company and pirating CDs and DVDs. This change has been reflected in law enforcement acronyms. They are no longer referred to as DTOs -- drug trafficking organizations -- but rather TCOs -- transnational criminal organizations.
With the changes in Mexico since the 1990s in terms of smuggling patterns, the types of drugs smuggled and the organizations smuggling them, it will be extremely difficult for the incoming administration to ignore their activities and adopt a hands-off approach. This means that Pena Nieto will not have the latitude to deviate very far from the policies of the Calderon administration.


Ingresaron 9,652 fusiles ilegales de Alemania a México (Aristeguinoticias.com:23/10/2012)

El diario Tageszeitung–TAZ, de Alemania, publicó que la fiscalía de Stuttgart reconoció que miles de rifles de asalto de manufactura alemana ingresaron de manera ilegal a los estados de Guerrero, Chiapas, Chihuahua y Jalisco. 
La vocera de la fiscalía alemana, Claudia Krauth, aceptó que “hay armas que aparecieron en donde no estaría permitido que aparecieran”, en referencia a los cuatro estados mexicanos.
Se trata de nueve mil 652 fusiles de asalto modelo G36 de la empresa de fabricación de armas alemana Heckler & Koch, que recibieron cuerpos policíacos de estados vetados por la autoridad alemana para ser receptores de armamento procedente de este país.
La fiscalía determinará quién es el responsable de la entrega irregular de armamento: los funcionarios de la empresa alemana con sede en Oberndorf o las autoridades mexicanas, para lo cual pedirá ayuda al gobierno mexicano.
La exportación de armamento es un negocio lícito en Alemania pero cada cargamento que sale de este país tiene que ser con la autorización de la Oficina Federal de Exportación. Entre los años 2005 y 2007 esta oficina autorizó a la empresa productora de armamento la exportación de armas a México, con la excepción de que llegaran a los estados de Chiapas, Chihuahua, Jalisco y Guerrero.
A partir de la petición de la fiscalía alemana, el gobierno mexicano tendría que investigar si sus autoridades habrían realizado la entrega ilegal de armas a estos estados.
En Alemania vetaron la venta de armas a algunos estados de México; sin embargo, en esos territorios encontraron armas del país europeo. (Foto: Heckler & Koch)

“Las autoridades mexicanas, la empresa de fabricación de armas alemana y/o las propias autoridades agermanas, quienes a pesar de ser conscientes de la corrupción y la situación en materia de derechos humanos han dado su consentimiento para la exportación de armas”, sostuvo el diario alemán.

jueves, 15 de noviembre de 2012

Con mantas, el narco reprocha a Calderón "cómo nos trató y el dolor que nos causó". (La Jornada 15/11/2013)


A 15 días de que concluya el mandato de Felipe Calderón, ayer se colocaron mantas firmadas por Los caballeros templarios en 16 municipios de Guanajuato; en 11 de Michoacán y en tres del estado de México.
La organización criminal reprocha al Presidente la forma en que nos trató y el dolor humano que nos causóotra cosa hubiera sido para Michoacán si usted hubiera tratado con amor a su pueblo y justicia verdadera; al final se despiden de él y le desean que le vaya bonito.
Las mantas, tituladas Mensaje para el Sr. Presidente Felipe de Jesús Calderón Hinojosa, dicen textualmente: “ya que sólo este medio tenemos para comunicarnos, que nunca estuvimos de acuerdo en la forma en que nos trató, su intención tal vez era buena mas no la forma.
Sin embargo, aún con el dolor humano que nos causó y las heridas hechas que siguen latentes, les queremos decir que aprendimos mucho, pues también nosotros como pueblo rebelde o muy heroico reconocemos que también a sus PFPS (policías federales) les causamos heridas y muy merecidas, nosotros como pueblo o hermandad lo quisimos respetar, pero usted nunca voltió la mirada hacia nosotros.
Y agregan: “en buen plan o, ante todo y por todo nos disculpamos, y como ya no lo vamos a tener en diciembre como nuestro gobernante, le deseamos a usted, su familia y gabinete que les vaya como dijo Vicente Fernández…. ojala que le vaya bonito”.
En Guanajuato, las mantas aparecieron en Cortázar, Salvatierra, Villagrán, Moroleón, Jerécuaro, Uriangato, Tarandacuao, Coroneo, Salamanca, Irapuato, Comonfort, Ácambaro, Apaseo El Grande, Celaya, León y Tarimoro.
En Michoacán, en Morelia, Apatzingán, Tepalcatepec, Buena Vista, Aguililla, Zitácuaro, Hidalgo, Zamora, La Piedad, Vista Hermosa, Lázaro Cárdenas, y en el estado de México, en Toluca, Metepec y Calimaya.